Exploring Pakistan’s Regional Economic Cooperation Potential by A.R. Kemal
The Pakistan Development Review 




The Presidential Address 
 






Free trade benefits are not well-harnessed despite the WTO because of the 
regional groupings. Such groupings have, in fact, resulted in a chaos. Pakistan has 
been a member of the SAARC and the ECO. In both the groups, intra-regional trade 
accounts for only four percent of total trade. The present study briefly reviews and 
identifies constraints to intra-regional trade and other modes of economic cooperation 
in the region.  The SAFTA agreement and the possibilities of greater economic 
cooperation are also examined. Comparative advantage and low trade complementarity 
are found to be the main impediments to trade. Other obstacles such as limited 
capacity to generate exportable surpluses, restrictive trade policies, and political 
problems have also inhibited the growth of intra-regional trade. Higher trade levels 
can be achieved through intra-industry trade, vertical specialisation, joint export 
marketing of competing regional export products, deepening trade liberalisation, 
promoting monetary cooperation, and encouraging joint industrial ventures. It is 
imperative for the success of SAFTA that the negative list is kept quite small and the 
countries are prepared for closure of a few industries. Thus the SAFTA has great 
potential and South Asian countries should accept short-term costs for long-run 
benefits. Expansion of trade as well as efficiency and improved quality of exports 
would benefit the countries participating in the regional co-operation effort.   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the GATT and now the WTO, regional trade arrangements have 
proliferated, resulting in what Bhagwati (1995) calls a “Spaghetti Bowl” of tariffs. 
The member countries apply different rates of tariffs on products imported from 
member and non-member countries and deny the advantages of free trade to the 
non-member countries. Free trade intentions of the regional trade arrangements, 
therefore, may have resulted in a chaos and thus the impact of regional 
arrangements on the welfare of member countries and the world at large has been 
widely debated [see for example, Viner (1950); Meade (1955); Lipsey (1957); 
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Corden (1972); Kemp and Wan (1976); Kowalczyk (1990); Bhagwati (1971, 
1993); Melo and Panagariya (1993); Anderson and Blackhurst (1993); Baldwin 
and Venables (1995); Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996); Srinivasan (1993, 1997); 
Vamvakids (1998); Bhagwati, Krishna and Panagariya (1999); Clausing (2001) 
and Panagariya (1999, 2000)].
1  
Pakistan is a member of two regional groupings, viz., the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Economic Cooperation 
Organisation (ECO), but none of the two has been successful in promoting intra-
regional trade in a significant way. Despite the preferential treatment, intra-regional 
trade has been around 4 percent of the total trade in both the ECO and the SAARC. 
The Islamabad SAARC Summit Declaration promises the South Asian Free Trade Area 
(SAFTA) by 2015, and is expected to promote economic cooperation amongst the South 
Asian countries.  The ECO has also taken important initiatives for the promotion of 
economic cooperation.  
The lack of success in promoting trade in both the regions despite the agreements 
and pronouncements at highest levels reflects the ambivalent attitude of the member 
countries towards regional cooperation. While South Asian Preferential Trade 
Agreement (SAPTA) and Framework Agreement for Trade Cooperation (FAT) were 
signed during the last decade, most of the member countries are still reluctant to grant 
preferential treatment to the products of export interest to the member countries.  
The success of regional integration, preferential treatment, free trade area or a 
custom union, depends on a number of factors, and most important of which are the 
pattern of comparative advantage, extent of trade complementarity within a regional 
trading bloc and tariff rates on the products of export interest of the member 
countries. 
Intra-regional trade is promoted in situations where members have 
comparative advantage in diverse products and exhibit strong trade 
complementarities. On the other hand, prospects of regional trade expansion are 
likely to be limited if the production and trade structures of member countries are 
characterised by identical pattern of comparative advantage and low trade 
complementarities.
2  However, various constraints may not allow the trade to 
flourish despite the comparative advantage and low transport costs. The constraints 
to possibilities of trade expansion and other modes of economic cooperation, 
therefore, need to be identified and resolved.   
The present study briefly reviews intra-regional trade both in the SAARC as 
well as ECO and identifies constraints to intra-regional trade and other modes of 
 
1For an excellent survey of regional trade arrangements, see Panagariya (2000). 
2Obviously if trade is opened up, there are possibilities of changes in comparative advantage and a 
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economic cooperation.  Brief review of the literature of regional cooperation and its 
implications is presented in Section II. The levels and patterns of intra-regional trade 
are examined in Section III. Constraints to intra-regional trade especially the trade 
complementarities, revealed comparative advantage and intra-industry trade are 
analysed in Section IV. The possibilities of investment and joint ventures are 
analysed in Section V. SAFTA agreement and possibilities of greater economic 
cooperation are examined in Section VI. Main conclusions are summarised in 
Section VII. 
 
II. REGIONAL COOPERATION AND ECONOMIC WELFARE  
Regional arrangements may take various forms including:  
 (i)  Preferential Trade Area: Preferential treatment is granted to the member 
countries in the form of reduction in the import duty on their exports. 
 (ii)  Free Trade Area: Imports are allowed duty-free from the member 
countries, but each country individually determines the level of tariffs on 
the non-member countries.   
 (iii) Custom Union: Besides allowing duty-free imports from the member 
countries, uniform tariff is imposed on the imports from the non-member 
countries. 
 (iv) Economic Union: Besides the duty-free tariffs on member countries and 
uniform tariff for the non-member countries, factors of production move 
freely across the member countries. Moreover, it has uniform competition 
policy and all other measures aimed at strengthening of market mechanism; 
common policies for structural change and regional development; and 
macro-economic policy considerations including binding rules for budgetary 
policies. The countries may have the same currency as well.  
Viner (1950) was the first one to examine the impact of regional groupings on 
the welfare and introduced the concept of trade creation and trade diversion. 
However, he made restrictive assumptions of zero demand and supply elasticities. 
Subsequently Meade (1955) relaxed the assumption of zero price elasticity of 
demand and Lipsey (1957) relaxed the assumptions of zero supply elasticity as well. 
The main conclusion of these studies has been that if trade creation and trade 
expansion exceeds the trade diversion, regional integration would be welfare-
promoting and vice-versa. The analysis presented by Viner, Meade and Lipsey has 
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Changes in the welfare due to preferences granted to member countries
4 
depends to a large extent whether the most efficient producer of a particular product 
in the world is part of the group or not. If the efficient producer is part of the group, 
economic integration would always be welfare promoting. However, if the efficient 
producer is outside the group the impact on welfare will be uncertain and depends on 
a number of factors. Firstly, the trade diversion would result in lower level of 
welfare. Second, even when the most efficient producer is not part of the regional 
group, trade creation possibilities still exist. If prior to the forming of regional block, 
tariff was prohibitive, trade would be created as long as preferential tariff is not 
prohibitive. Third, the static analysis underestimates the benefits and it is generally 
believed that the major benefits of forming trade blocs are dynamic. Regional 
grouping results in specialisation in accordance with comparative advantage and the 
scale economies would result in reduction in costs of production and that is welfare 
improving. During 1980s and 1990s, most of the work in this area has been towards 
examining the dynamic effects of trade blocs. See for example, Bhagwati (1993); 
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996); Levy (1997); Krugman (1993) and Srinivasan 
(1991). Fourth, Wonnacott and Lutz (1989); Summers (1991) and Krugman (1993) 
have espoused “Natural Trading Partner” hypothesis and conclude that more the two 
countries trade with each other relative to the outside world, the less likely that a 
union between them will be harmful.  
Do the regional groupings bloc movement towards free trade? Bhagwati 
(1993) and Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) examine the issue on the basis of two 
alternative assumptions, viz., regional and multilateral processes do not interact and 
proceed independently and formation of regional blocs makes the success of the 
multilateral process more, or less likely. They conclude that regional blocs are an 
unnecessary nuisance in the way of trade. Similarly, Levy (1997) suggests trading 
blocs make the multilateral trade less feasible. Moreover, it is suggested that feasible 
multilateral liberalisation becomes infeasible in case of differentiated products 
through if there are homogeneous products regional grouping do not block a 
previously feasible multilateral accord.  
Various studies have examined impact of trade policies on the basis of 
changes in the trade share of intra-regional trade before and after the formation of 
regional blocs. Such studies implicitly assume that the share of trade with partner 
countries would not have changed in the absence of the agreement [see Krueger 
(1999); Cline (1978); de la Torre and Kelly (1992); Drysdale and Garnaut (1993); 
 
4Whether or not the partner countries and the world gains or loses depends on the pre- and post-
tariff rates and the nature of agreement. Some authors, such as Krugman (1991, 1994), believe that 
preferential arrangements between natural trading partners are likely to be welfare inducing, the others, 
including Bhagwati (1994), fear that preferential trading arrangements may lead to trade diversion.  Regional Economic Cooperation 
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Robertson (1970); Saxonhouse (1994)]. However, the assumption may not be very 
realistic and, therefore, a more sophisticated counterfactual is necessary to assess the 
effect of an agreement on extent of trade creation relative to trade diversion. 
Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (1992); Brown and Stern (1989); Haaland and 
Norman (1992) have used CGE simulations for the counterfactuals. However, CGE 
models are very sensitive to the assumptions, parameters, and data used to estimate 
them, and have to be interpreted accordingly. Simulations that provide the 
counterfactuals have suffered from manipulation of the structure of the model, 
functional forms and parameter values in these models [see Vamvakidis (1998) and 
Clausing (2001)].  
For counterfactuals, gravity equations have also been estimated to assess the 
impact of preferential arrangements on trade flows. These equations have the 
advantage of including several variables that are affecting trade flows, such as 
income changes and exchange rate variables. A dummy variable is used to assess the 
impact of various preferential trading agreements on trade flows [see Frankel and 
Wei (1995); Frankel and Kahler (1993); Frankel (1997); Krueger (1999); Aitken 
(1973); George, et al. (1977); and Willmore (1976)]. However, the gravity model 
also suffers from various problems. Firstly, the dummy variables may not be 
capturing the effects of preferential trade liberalisation only and may reflect the 
impact of certain other variables. Second, they fail to distinguish the extent of trade 
creation relative to trade diversion. Third, trade flows are examined at a highly 
aggregative level and fail to examine the extent of trade liberalisation across goods 
or industries.  
 
III.  INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE IN THE SAARC AND THE ECO 
Pakistan is part of both SAARC and ECO and despite the South Asian 
Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) and Framework Agreement for Trade 
Cooperation (FAT) in ECO, the intra-regional trade in both the groups is around 
4 percent (see Table 1).  The preferential treatment has led to only a marginal 
increase in the share of intra-regional trade due to a number of factors. Firstly, 
negotiations under SAPTA and FAT have been conducted mainly on a product-
by-product basis, which though allows some flexibility to each member country, 
is time consuming. Second, the depth of tariff cuts offered under the two has not 
been very substantial. For example, India has offered the preferences on a large 
number of products and the margins have been the maximum but its MFN rates 
have been higher than those of its partners, and as such concessions had very 
little impact. Third, actual trade coverage of the preferences has been       
limited; most of the products to which concessions were given are not widely 






 Intra-SAARC  Trade 
World Trade of 
SAARC Countries 
Share of Intra-
SAARC Trade in 
World Trade of 
SAARC Countries 
1980 1210  37885  3.2 
1985 1054  44041  2.4 
1990 1584  65041  2.4 
1995 4228  104159  4.1 
1996 4914  111479  4.4 
1997 4390  115961  3.8 
1998 6073  121331  5.0 
1999 5640  129738  4.4 
2000 5884  141978  4.1 
2001 6537  139585  4.7 
Source: Weerakoon and Wijayasiri (2003). 
 
tariff and non-tariff measures out of the purview of negotiations has also been one of 
the factors in constraining the growth of intra-regional trade. Fifth, high local 
content criterion has also acted as one of the constraints. 
Whereas intra-regional trade on an average in SAARC is rather low, the 
shares differ both across countries and for the import and exports. Shares of 
intra-regional imports were 33.2, 11.7, 10.1, 2.3 and 0.7 percent of the total 
imports of Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and India respectively in 
2000. Moreover, share of the regional imports in case of Bangladesh quadrupled, 
that of Sri Lanka increased by almost one half, those of India and Nepal have 
marginally increased, and that of Pakistan shows some fluctuations but there 
seems to be an increasing trend over 1985-2000 period (see Table 2). Trends in 
intra-regional exports reveal a different picture (see Table 3). For instance, share 
of Bangladesh has gone down from 7.7 percent in 1985 to 1.6 percent in 2000, of 
Nepal from 38.3 percent to 30.0 percent, of Sri Lanka from 3.8 to 1.8 percent 
and of Pakistan from 5.3 percent to 2.9 percent. However, that of India increased 
from 3.3 percent in 1985 to 4.4 percent in 2000. [For details see Kemal, et al. 




Percentage Shares of Intra-regional Imports in Total Imports 
Year  Bangladesh   India   Nepal   Pakistan   Sri Lanka  
1985  3.46 0.69  32.43 1.59 6.17 
1986  3.57 0.49  32.44 1.75 7.64 
1987  4.28 0.5 18.8  1.61 6.49 
1988  5.28 0.48  18.09 1.86 7.79 
1989  4.48 0.28  12.11 1.75 5.79 
1990 6.84  0.41  11.7  1.64  6.74 
1991  7.47 0.54  13.76 1.42 6.88 
1992  10.13  0.83 17.4  1.48 11.89 
1993  11.88  0.45 17.23  1.55 10.11 
1994  12.76  0.49 18.37  1.55 10.58 
1995  17.66  0.53 17.53  1.46 11.08 
1996  16.29 0.5 28.55 2.41  12.59 
1997  12.91  0.45 26.76  1.96 10.7 
1998  17.26  1.11 31.66  2.42 10.09 
1999  13.47 0.80  31.99 1.94 9.78 
2000  11.68  0.73 33.15  2.32 10.11 
Source:  PIDE (2003). 
 
Table 3 
Percentage Shares of Intra-regional Exports in Total Exports 
Year Bangladesh  India  Nepal  Pakistan  Sri  Lanka 
1985 7.65  3.25  38.32  5.28  3.8 
1986 6.06  3.01  38.11  3.2  4.52 
1987 4.1  2.82  27.84  3.92  3.58 
1988 5  2.78  17.63  5.04  5.76 
1989 3.9  2.43  2.69  3.51  5.21 
1990 3.62  2.71  7.19  3.97  3.3 
1991 4.7  1.78  7.86  3.33  2.6 
1992 2.21  3.83  13.07  4.93  1.97 
1993 2.42  4.00  4.69  3.21  2.17 
1994 2.3  4.13  3.87  3.25  2.37 
1995 2.65  4.98  8.7  3.13  2.28 
1996 1.82  4.92  12.99  2.54  2.27 
1997 2.26  4.36  25.44  1.75  2.05 
1998 2.69  5.46  36.49  4.08  1.53 
1999 1.92  4.82  28.85  3.27  2.03 
2000 1.57  4.43  26.95  2.92  1.81 
Source:  PIDE (2003). A. R. Kemal 
 
320 
It has been observed that relatively smaller countries of SAARC have the pro-
regional bias in their trade structure while larger countries, both Pakistan and India, 
have an anti-regional bias in their trade structure. Moreover, India’s trade has not 
only an anti-region bias, the index of trade balance
5 for India falls short of unity as 
well; her exports to the region have invariably been higher than her imports [see 
Kemal, et al. (2002)]. Unless the benefits of trade liberalisation accrue to all the 
trading partners, possibilities of trade expansion in SAARC would be rather limited. 
The Framework Agreement on ECO Trade Cooperation (FAT)
6 calls for 
progressive elimination of non-tariff barriers as well as gradual reduction of tariffs in 
the region with a view to promoting trade. The intra-regional exports in the ECO 




Percentage Shares of ECO Intra-regional Exports in Total Exports 
Years 
Country  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Afghanistan     n.a.     n.a.     n.a.     n.a.     n.a. 
Azerbaijan  49.0 51.2 33.1 35.3 12.9 
Iran  19.0 15.4 19.4 24.3  3.4 
Kazakhstan  8.5 8.8 7.8 7.4 6.1 
Kyrgyzstan  39.7 51.7 37.4 29.7 26.5 
Pakistan  3.3 2.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 
Tajikistan  20.6 31.6 28.9 27.7 26.4 
Turkey  4.2 4.9 4.9 4.2 3.3 
Turkmenistan  22.5 11.9 40.5 65.2 15.7 
Uzbekistan  20.1 11.8 11.7 15.4  n.a. 
Share of Intra-regional 
Exports in Total 
Exports to the World  11.34  8.71  10.55  10.61  4.15 
 
5The index of trade balances (TB) is  
              
Exports   regional - intra   in country    the   of   Share
Imports   regional - intra   in country    the   of   Share
      TB =  
If TB exceeds unity, the country runs deficits; 
If TB is equal to unity, trade is balanced; and 
if TB is less than unity, the country runs surpluses. It should be noted that the trade balance 
indices are reported here only to highlight the existing pattern of intra-regional trade, and not to argue for 
balanced trade within the region.  
6It was signed on March 6, 2000 by all the Member States (except Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). Regional Economic Cooperation 
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Source: ECO Annual Economic Report 2000. 
regional imports in the total imports have declined from 11.1 to just 4.2 percent and 
that of exports from 11.3 to 4.2 percent over 1995-99 period. There are wide 
variations across various countries; intra-regional imports is 3.3 percent for Pakistan, 
2.8 percent for Turkey, 3.6 percent for Iran, 4.6 percent for Kazakhstan, 12.5 percent 
for Turkmenistan, 12.5 percent for Azerbaijan, 22.6 percent for Kyrgyzstan and 28.3 
percent for Tajikistan of their total imports (see Table 5). The shares of intra-
regional exports also vary significantly and are the lowest in case of Turkey and 
Pakistan, i.e., 3.3 and 3.0 percent respectively. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan show the maximum intra-regional trade. While Pakistan’s trade within 
ECO accounts for only 3 percent of its total trade, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan and 
to some extent Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan account for bulk of Pakistan’s intra-
regional trade. It is low with Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan 
[Kemal (2003)].  
 
Table 5 
Percentage Shares of ECO Intra-regional Imports in Total Imports 
Years 
Country  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Afghanistan  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Azerbaijan  44.9 34.8 36.6 31.4 22.6 
Iran  32.8 34.5 25.9 24.2  3.6 
Kazakhstan  13.5 8.4 5.4 5.8 4.6 
Kyrgyzstan  35.1 41.5 39.6 31.6 28.3 
Pakistan  2.7 2.4 3.3 2.3 3.3 
Tajikistan  42.9 46.3 48.1 46.9 59.3 
Turkey  3.2 2.7 2.3 2.1 2.8 
Turkmenistan  25.2 18.7 30.0 25.9 12.5 
Uzbekistan  18.1 15.7 14.9 13.3  n.a. 
Share of Intra-regional 
Imports in Total Imports 
from  the  World  11.13 9.58 8.51 7.82 4.18 
Source: ECO Annual Economic Report 2000. 
 
IV.  ECONOMIC COOPERATION: IMPEDIMENTS 
There have been various attempts to foster mutually beneficial economic 
relations both in SAARC and ECO including SAPTA in SAARC and FAT in ECO. 
The weak trade linkages may be attributed to several structural as well as policy-A. R. Kemal 
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induced factors including identical comparative advantage, lack of 
complementarities, low intra-industry trade, lack of exportable surpluses, lack of 
communication links, restrictive trade policies, and lack of finances. Besides, lack of 
political commitment has been the major stumbling block in the way of economic 
cooperation.  
 
Identical Comparative Advantage  
Both the SAARC and to a lesser extent ECO are characterised by an almost 
identical pattern of comparative advantage in a relatively narrow range of products, 
and consequently they have weak complementarities in their bilateral trade 
structures. It is generally believed that the economies of South Asia are quite similar 
and therefore they have similar comparative advantage. The revealed comparative 
advantage, ratio of the share of a given product in a country’s exports to its share in 
world exports, may be used to determine the comparative advantage.  










  Rih   = Revealed comparative advantage ratio for country i in product h 
 X ih = Country  i’s exports of product h 
 X it  =  Total exports of country i 
 X wh = World exports of product h 
 X wt  =  Total World exports. 
A country is said to have a revealed comparative advantage (disadvantage) in 
a product if the ratio exceeds or falls short of unity. However, it may give misleading 
results in the presence of distortions in the market. Therefore the pattern of “true” 
comparative advantage may differ from the one suggested by the revealed 
comparative advantage ratios.  
The Revealed Comparative Advantage at three digit classification reported in 
Kemal, et al. (2002) show that  
  •  The pattern of revealed comparative advantage is quite similar across the 
South Asian countries;  
  •  With the exception of India and Sri Lanka, the South Asian countries enjoy 
comparative advantage in a relatively narrow range of products. 
Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan out of 71 commodity groups have revealed Regional Economic Cooperation 
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comparative advantage in only 7, 5 and 12 commodity groups while India 
and Sri Lanka have comparative advantage in 26 and 21 product 
categories; and 
  • Not surprisingly, none of the countries has comparative advantage in 
capital intensive and high value-added products. 
 
Lack of Trade Complementarities 
It is generally presumed that success of regional integration depends largely 
on the extent of trade complementarities.  The complementarity indices
7 estimated in 
Kemal, et al. (2002) are reproduced in this section. Trade complementarity index is 
defined below: 
( ) 2 | | 1 ÷ − − = ∑ hj hi ij x m C  
Where 
 C ij = Trade Complementarity index for trade between countries i and j 
 m hi = Share of good h in total imports of country i 
 x hj = Share of good h in total exports of country j. 
The trade complementarity index is zero when no good exported by one country is 
imported by the other, and equals one when the shares of one country’s imports 
correspond exactly to those of the other’s exports. 
There is a lack of strong complementarity in the bilateral trade structures of 
South Asian countries. Similarities in the trade structures, together with absence of 
comparative advantage in capital intensive and high value-added products, i.e. the 
products that are normally imported by countries in the region, may have played a 
role in constraining the growth of intra regional trade in South Asia.  
 
Intra-industry Trade 
Whereas the comparative advantage on the basis of factor endowments 
suggests that the trade would take place only if there are differences in factor 
endowments, Grubel-Lloyd (1975) argue that differences in the level of technology 
and human capital can lead to intra-industry trade even in products with identical 
factor input requirements. Krugman (1981) argues that industries in which 
increasing returns are achieved at a fairly low level of output can accommodate 
many producers, with each producing differentiated products. Under these 
circumstances, each country will specialise in different varieties of the product and 
 
7Because of the non-availability of disaggregated data on most of the ECO region, the 
complementarity indices cannot be estimated. However, the indices are expected to be larger. A. R. Kemal 
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engage in intra-industry trade. Regional integration schemes involving cross-country 
production sharing arrangements
8 have also resulted in increased intra-industry-
trade. Yeats (1998) points out that production sharing has become a major factor in 
regional trading arrangements.  
The Grubel-Lloyd intra-industry trade helps in determining the intra-industry 
trade. The index is defined as: 
()
() h h
h h h h
h M X








 G h = Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade in industry h 
 X h = Exports of industry h 
 M h  =  Imports of industry h. 
The Grubel-Lloyd index ranges between 0 and 1 with larger values indicating 
a greater degree of intra-industry trade. The Grubel-Lloyd indices for SAARC 
countries reported in Kemal, et al. (2002) lead us to conclude:  
  •  Historical pattern of intra-industry trade amongst the South Asian countries 
is highly erratic, and there are only a few products in which intra-industry 
trade has occurred on a sustained basis; 
  •  With few exceptions, leather products, textiles and clothing, and some basic 
machinery and tools dominate the intra-industry trade profiles of the South 
Asian countries; and 
  • The proportion of intra-industry trade in total trade has been very low for 
most of the products, implying a low intensity of intra-industry trade in the 
region. This is also reflected in the average bilateral Grubel-Lloyd indices 
of intra-industry trade. 
 
Lack of Export Diversification  
All the countries belonging to SAARC and ECO are deficient in capital, and 
the industrial base is hardly diversified. The regional exports largely consist of raw 
materials and traditional products, and where they have comparative advantages, are 
competitors in the world export market rather than trading amongst themselves. 
Given the scenario, both the SAARC as well as ECO trade is tilted towards 
developed countries. If this pattern is to change trade sharing arrangements and 
vertical integration may be necessary which besides provision of intra-regional trade 
 
8Under the production sharing arrangements, various stages of the production process for a 
specific product are undertaken in different countries, giving rise to intra-industry trade. Regional Economic Cooperation 
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would also help in the realisation of dynamic advantage.  
  
Lack of Transport Communication Links 
Because of the poor communication links production, consumption, and trade 
patterns of potential trading partners sometimes are unknown to the partner 
countries.  The inadequate trade facilitation mechanisms such as high handling and 
transportation charges and delays in delivery, implies that potential of intra-regional 
trade cannot be fully utilised. The land route and railway links in SAARC depend on 
the transit facilities provided by India; Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal have to pass 
through India. In ECO, seven of the ten countries are landlocked and Afghanistan is 
the key to trade between Pakistan and Central Asian Republics. The shipping 
facilities are also inadequate and many a products could not be traded in SAARC 
due to lack of such facilities.  
  
Monetary Cooperation 
These countries have generally faced severe foreign exchange constraints due 
to persistent imbalances in their current accounts. The paucity of foreign exchange 
may have been an impediment to intra-regional trade. Monetary cooperation such as 
the Asian Clearing Union (ACU) can facilitate intra-regional trade by obviating the 
need for hard currencies for settling regional trade balances.   
 
Political Problems 
Apart from problems on the economic front, political differences have 
undermined efforts to foster regional economic cooperation especially in SAARC. 
Political differences between Pakistan and India have been the main constraining 
factor towards trade expansion within SAARC. In general the smaller countries in 
the region have been generally skeptic towards regional economic cooperation 
initiatives. The political conflicts as well as differences in economic outlooks have 
been strong impediments to intra-regional trade. 
 
V.  PROMOTION OF INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE  
AND INVESTMENT 
Intra-industry trade can flourish even in situations where the trade and 
production structures of the trading partners lack strong complementarities. The 
trade expansion helps in reaping dynamic scale economies. Therefore, trade 
linkages among the South Asian countries need to be strengthened by devising 
mechanisms to promote intra-industry trade within the region. One way to A. R. Kemal 
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accomplish this is through regional production sharing arrangements that involve 
the initiation of part of a manufacturing process for a specific good in one country 
and the transfer of the activity to another for further processing.
9  The South Asian 
countries can achieve greater economic cooperation and integration by evolving a 
vertically integrated regional production structure in sectors that are of economic 
significance in the regional context.
10 This would allow the South Asian 
economies to specialise in different lines of production within a particular industry 
and thus achieve benefits of specialisation and scale economies. The regional 
production sharing arrangements generally emerge in response to a combination 
of factors including low tariffs, wage differentials, low transportation costs, and 
favourable policies. 
Since the basic objective of any economic grouping is to liberalise and expand 
trade within the region, removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers in the region, 
regulatory and enabling environment for trade are essential. Moreover, increasing 
the inter-connection of private sector in various product groups would be rather 
helpful in promotion of trade, establishment of joint ventures, and the visits of 
businessmen across countries. In this regard, visa policy of the regional economies 
can play an important role in promoting trade. The institutional and human resource 
capacity of the private sector to deal with the complexity of regional and multi-
lateral trade agreements needs to be enhanced.   
Joint ventures can be important instruments for pooling regional resources 
to promote industrialisation and economic growth.  In view of the fact that these 
countries have collectively gained substantial experience in agro-based 
industries, textiles and clothing, paper and pulp, and light engineering, there 
seems to be a scope for joint ventures in these areas. It may be pointed out that 
the establishment of joint ventures will particularly benefit the small countries 
because they generally lack the resources to undertake industrial investment on 
an efficient scale. 
 
VI.  THE SAFTA AGREEMENTS AND POSSIBILITIES OF  
INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE 
The Islamabad Declaration promises the South Asian Free Trade Area 
(SAFTA) coming into force on January 1, 2006, with full implementation by 2015. 
The SAFTA calls upon India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, relatively more developed 
countries in the region, to reduce tariffs to 20 percent by 2006 and Nepal, Bhutan, 
 
9For instance, electronic components may be produced in country A, shipped to country B for 
assembly, and then re-exported back to country A. 
10Some of the potential areas where regional production sharing systems can be developed are 
leather products, textiles and clothing, and basic machinery. Regional Economic Cooperation 
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Bangladesh and Maldives, relatively less developed countries, are required to reduce 
tariffs to 30 percent by 2006. Following that Pakistan and India in five years, Sri 
Lanka in six years and other SAARC countries in 8 years shall have to reduce tariffs 
to 0–5 percent level. Moreover, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka will reduce their 
tariffs on imports from the relatively less developed countries to 0-5 percent by 
January 1, 2009. Tariff reductions, rules of origin, safeguards, institutional 
structures, and dispute settlement will be sorted out by various committees.
11  It also 
calls for adoption of various trade facilitation measures, such as harmonisation of 
standards and customs procedures, and transport infrastructure cooperation.  
The agreement calls for elimination of all quantitative restrictions, though it 
allows a sensitive list of products on which preferences may not be accorded. 
However, such a list is not expected to be more than 20 percent of the total number 
of potentially traded products. The products on the sensitive list are to be reviewed at 
four-year intervals with a view to reducing the list and expanding the free trade 
coverage of the Agreement.  
The six broad factor that result in success of regional groupings has been 
enumerated in the World Bank (2004). Firstly, a regional trade agreement does not 
automatically result in increased trade and growth. This is because a large number of 
interest groups emerge who on the grounds of injury to their industry, call for 
exemption from reduction in the import duties. Experience with SAPTA has been 
disappointing for that reason. SAFTA allows a sensitive list and if the list is large, 
then SAFTA may not result in higher intra-regional trade. Agreements that keep 
high trade barriers to protect inefficient activities undermine the competitiveness.  
Second, those trading arrangements which were preceded or accompanied 
by unilateral efforts among members to reduce external protection have been more 
successful. Reducing trade barriers vis-à-vis the rest of the world creates an 
incentive for all members to export. It augments competition that drives domestic 
productivity [see Muendler (2002)]. As is quite well known, when external 
protection is generally low, trade creation usually dominates trade diversion, and 
so the risks that regional agreements will be a drag on growth is substantially 
reduced. Indeed regional agreements where members have had low external 
protection have enjoyed greatest success [see Baldwin and Venables (1995) and 
Burfisher, et al. (2003)].    
Third, regional groupings between the countries with different factor 
endowments allow opportunities to exploit differentials in wage rates, capital 
 
11With a view to ensuring that agreement is implemented, it establishes the SAFTA Ministerial 
Council, the regional body’s highest decision-making authority, and a Committee of Experts responsible 
for monitoring implementation and resolving disputes. The Committee of Experts is required to update the 
Ministerial Council every six months on the progress of the Agreement. A. R. Kemal 
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availability and technological levels [Schiff and Winters (2003) and Lederman, et al. 
(2003)]. However, this conclusion runs contrary to the success of EU. The 
promotion of intra-industry trade would result in higher growth even if factor 
endowments are similar.   
Fourth, a regional integration framework that helps in trade creation and 
competition amongst regional countries would help in lowering domestic prices and 
providing new technology. It is impossible to have the benefits of a regional 
agreement without exposing the member economies to new competition [Hoekman 
and Schiff (2002)]. 
Fifth, competition in services also results in successful integration. Lowering 
the cost of telecommunications, finance, business services, and retail and wholesale 
commerce would result in productivity gains.  
Finally, there is a need to streamline border transactions through trade 
facilitation. Increase in efficiency within the region often spills over into trade 
outside the region as well, because improving customs or improving efficiency of 
ports helps both intra-regional trade and international trade.   
To ensure success of SAFTA, the member countries have to take a number of 
initiatives. Firstly, all countries must have very small sensitive list and simple and 
transparent ground rules should be laid for putting a product on the sensitive list. 
Second, keeping rules of origin simple and transparent, and ensuring that they must 
not become devices of protection and impediments to trade. Third, since some of the 
SAARC members may dump their products and/or provide subsidies to exports 
resulting in unfair competition, the transparent anti-dumping and countervailing 
methods would be necessary. Fourth, intra-industry trade can play an important role 
in bolstering economic and trade relations within the region. An increased level of 
intra-industry trade in the region can only be achieved if the regional countries are 
able to develop the technological capacity to produce different product varieties at 
declining average cost. Fifth, joint ventures can be important instruments for pooling 
regional resources to promote industrialisation and economic growth in the South 
Asian region.  
What would be the impact of the SAFTA?  RIS (2004) reports results of 
studies conducted in the framework of the gravity model. It suggests that complete 
elimination of tariffs under SAFTA may increase the intra-regional trade by 1.6 
times the existing level. It further suggests that in the dynamic framework the gains 
from liberalisation are at least 25 percent higher than the static gains. However, these 
gains are grossly understated in view of SAARC’s large trade potential; it exists both 
in terms of trade diversion from traditional sources towards SAARC countries by 
removing the constraints and in terms of trade creation and trade expansion by Regional Economic Cooperation 
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easing import restrictions on products which, are in general, not being traded 
amongst SAARC countries but are the major exports of South Asian countries. It 
needs to be underscored, that while more than half the exports of manufactured 
goods from South Asia consist of textiles and leather products, they are subject to 
very high rates of import duties and/or quantitative restrictions and even outright 
bans in South Asia.  Similarly, rather limited trade in engineering goods is due to a 
number of factors including reliance on foreign aid to finance the import of capital 
goods, poor quality of goods and heavy import duties on capital goods even by the 
countries who are themselves exporters of capital goods.  
 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
Regional economic cooperation is increasingly being viewed as a vehicle for 
expediting the process of economic development through trade expansion, improvement 
in productivity, specialisation in accordance with comparative advantage and improved 
quality of products.  Pakistan has been a member of SAARC and ECO but in both the 
groups, intra-regional trade accounts for only 4 percent of total trade.  
Similar comparative advantage and low trade complementarity are the main 
impediments to trade. Nevertheless, other impediments such as limited capacity to 
generate exportable surpluses, restrictive trade policies, and political problems have 
also inhibited the growth of intra-regional trade.  However, through intra-industry 
trade; achieving vertical specialisation; joint export marketing of competing regional 
export products; deepening trade liberalisation, promoting monetary cooperation; 
and encouraging joint industrial ventures can result in higher trade. But regional 
economic cooperation is unlikely to succeed without political harmony and 
convergence in economic perceptions, which are essential pre-requisites for forging 
an economic and trade alliance.  
The signing of SAFTA has created euphoria in the South Asian countries. 
However, there are at least two possibilities which may make it redundant. Firstly, 
all the countries are members of WTO and would reduce the tariff levels. If their 
MFN tariffs are close to preferential tariffs under SAFTA, intra-regional trade may 
not grow at a rapid rate. Though one could argue that at lower rate of import duty, 
with or without SAFTA, the intra-regional and trade outside the region would 
flourish. Second and more importantly, if the sensitive list is large and includes most 
of the products of export interest of South Asian countries, then the trade would not 
flourish. For the success of SAFTA it is imperative that the negative list is quite 
small and the countries must be prepared for closure of a few industries. Similarly, 
the rules of origin should be so formulated that they do not constrain the growth of 
intra-regional trade. Moreover, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, though A. R. Kemal 
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necessary for fair trade, should not be used for protective measures.  
The SAFTA has great potential and South Asian countries should accept the 
short-term costs for long-run benefits. Nevertheless, SAARC countries must make 
an effort to make SAFTA a success, because that would expedite the process of 
economic development, mainly because of the problems in global market access and 
the higher transaction costs of producing for the world market. Expansion of trade, 
efficiency and improved quality of exports would hopefully benefit the countries 
participating in the regional co-operation effort.   
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